David A. Rosenberg
Chief Economist & Strategist
drosenberg@gluskinsheff.com
+ 1 416 681 8919

April 28, 2010
Economic Commentary

Gluskin Sheff

MARKET MUSINGS & DATA DECIPHERING

Breakfast with Dave

WHILE YOU WERE SLEEPING

The drama continues following S&P's slice to Greece's debt rating (to junk status of BB+, a three-notch decline, which prompted a surge in 2-year bond yields to a Zeus-like 15%) and the two-notch decline to Portugal's rating, to A- from A+. The Euro has bounced back this morning and the flight to higher quality German and French bonds has partly reversed course as the markets are swirling with speculation that the IMF is about to announce a stepped-up aid package (yet again!) and the ECB's Trichet ("Mr. Euro" himself) is set to make a trip to Berlin to meet with German parliamentarians today. (In the U.S., the huge rally in Treasuries has subsided too as the bond market braces for $42 billion of fresh 5-year T-notes today). JGBs have rallied all the way to four-month lows, in terms of yield, to 1.28% — talk about a switch to defense (not to mention a slap in the face to the conventional wisdom that JGBs are an accident waiting to happen — see *Clock is Ticking on Japan's Low Debt Yields* on page 23 of the FT).

The problem of course is that if Greece is bailed out then surely Portugal, Ireland, Spain and perhaps even Italy may not be too far behind. The inability of Greece — and others within EMU — to enact an independent monetary policy at a time of crisis has exposed the flaws of the union. The lack of a cohesive national government is another flaw in times of turbulence, which is why the U.S.A. has longevity and the Eurozone likely does not. It may well be the time to assess why it was that past attempts at unionization in the region — the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union in the late 19th century — ultimately fizzled out.

While the Euro has come back this morning (temporary) from its year-low abyss, global equities are still reeling from the contagion concerns (the MSCI Asia Pac index down 1.5% today) and a stock market priced for perfection is once again confronting a world with blemishes. (Add to that the U.S. government's attacks on Goldman Sachs as another blemish, at least as far as the investment community is concerned — even John McCain got involved in yesterday's populist lynching: *"From the reading of these emails, there is no doubt their behavior was unethical and the American people will render a judgment."*)

Anyone notice the volume on the U.S. exchanges swell as the selling picked up steam yesterday in yet another in the long list of "distribution" sessions? (Volume on the exchanges surged to a combined 7.6 billion shares — the second highest level for the year.) Portugal's stock market has traded down to a 12-month low and it's so bad in Greece that the government has banned short selling for two months. (Hey, it worked in the once-capitalistic U.S.A. didn't it?) We see in the NYT that Barclay's analysts believe that Greece needs €90 billion to see them through, €40 billion for Portugal and €350 billion for Spain!

IN THIS ISSUE

- While you were sleeping – the drama continues following S&P's slice to Greece's debt rating
- Comment on yesterday's market action: I believe that for the first time in this 13-month flashy rally off the lows, investors are going to be re-introduced to the notion of risk
- U.S. home prices finally decline again: for the first time since April 2009, the seasonally adjusted Case-Shiller house price index declined
- Consumer confidence in the U.S. returns … well, sort of
- Canada — just how pristine?

Please see important disclosures at the end of this document.

Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. is one of Canada's pre-eminent wealth management firms. Founded in 1984 and focused primarily on high net worth private clients, we are dedicated to meeting the needs of our clients by delivering strong, risk-adjusted returns together with the highest level of personalized client service. For more information or to subscribe to Gluskin Sheff economic reports, visit www.gluskinsheff.com

That is €480 billion of refinancing help, which dwarfs the latest €45 billion EU-IMF joint aid announcement by a factor of TEN (according to Ken Rogoff, the IMF is maxed out after €200 billion)! Do euros grow on trees as fast as Bernanke-bucks? Would the ECB, modeled after the Bundesbank, ever resort to the printing press for a fiscal bailout? Where exactly is this money going to come from? You can see why commodities are still under pressure as V-shaped recovery hopes are given a sober second thought. Even in countries like Canada, small and open as it is, has seen its currency lose some of its altitude despite the widespread perception that the local economic and financial backdrop is pristine as can be (Canada is in relatively good shape, indeed, but we challenge some of that conventional wisdom below). What a time for the Bank of Canada to have moved the domestic money market to price in a 275 basis point tightening cycle. (Remember how the Asian crisis, which started with tiny Thailand, stopped the Fed's planned rate hikes in 1997 in its tracks and who knew that time that more rate cuts were coming down the pike? How many times has the front end of the Canada curve looked this attractive before?)

Yesterday was really as much, if not more, about Portugal than it was about Greece. Contagion risks are spreading

With that in mind, the Fed had better be very careful about changing any of its wordings in today's post-meeting press release (especially the day after the VIX index soars 30%). Recall the Bank of Canada's strident tone last week (watered down a tad by Governor Carney in yesterday's statement to the House of Commons) which prompted the money market or immediately price-in a rate hike at the June 1 meeting.

Yesterday was really as much, if not more, about Portugal than it was about Greece. Contagion risks are spreading as they were amidst the turmoil around Bear Stearns in early 2008 and we know how that turned out. Bear was not too big to fail; neither was Lehman thought to be at the time. And then the Obama team decided to bail out the other large banks with fiscal costs in the future that will massively constrain domestic economic growth.

However, maybe we should look beyond Greece and Portugal and turn our attention to Spain — the countries fiscal and current account deficits are the highest in the industrial world, except for Iceland

Let's look ahead — beyond Greece and Portugal to Spain. Its combined fiscal and current deficits are the highest in the industrialized world, save for Iceland (and we know what shape it is in). The amount of debt it has to refinance in the coming year is as large as the entire Greek economy (though the latter is getting smaller by the day). So this is not even a case of being too big to fail as much as being too interconnected globally to default. Think of all the global banks, most of them in Europe, which hold onto all this spurious Club Med debt. Moreover, if the other two major rating agencies follow S&P's lead and cuts Greece to "junk", then the ECB would be in a real bind for it cannot hold below-investment-grade bonds on its balance sheet. If the ECB does accept junk-rated Greek debt as collateral, then the sanctity of its balance sheet will be seriously undermined; though this ostensibly didn't matter too much to the Fed in the name of saving the system.

At the same time, refusing to accept Greek debt would exert tremendous strains on the European banking system (see *Hobson's Choice for Germany ECB* on page C16 of the WSJ; and also have a look at *Debt Crisis Poses Risks to ECB Balance Sheet* on page A12 of the WSJ). Whether or not all these countries can be saved by the IMF, Germany or the ECB, the reality is that the downside to the Euro, even at 1.32, is huge. Think of a retest to the lifetime lows of 0.85 at some point down the line.

We have the problems in Euroland, signs of a property bubble in China, and the Brazilian economy now in overheating phase to such an extent that the central bank is about to hike rates 100bps in one fell swoop

The Chinese stock market is down now for the fifth session in a row — the longest losing streak in 16 months and the lowest close since October 12, 2009 (dare we say when the S&P 500 was trading 100 points south of where it is today, and the Dow lower by a 1,000 points). And the index leads commodities by four months, so this is not exactly a constructive signpost as far as the near-term outlook for resource prices is concerned (see more below).

So, we have the problems in Euroland, signs of a property bubble in China, and the darling Brazilian economy now in overheating phase to such an extent that the central bank is about to hike rates 100bps in one fell swoop (did we mention the Henry Tax Review in Australia, which is due out on Sunday and set to propose tax changes for the resource and banking sectors?) — and yet all we hear from the rose-coloured bullish pundits is how we have to now measure the U.S. equity market based on "global considerations", not merely the American economy. Yesterday, we heard a classic rear-view-mirror comment from UPS CEO Scott Davis that went: *"Economies around the world are showing signs of recovery."* Every word in that comment was accurate except the tense — replace "are" with "were" (not to mention that this is classic top-of-the-market that defines the term "famous last words").

QUICK COMMENT ON YESTERDAY'S ACTION

Equities closed at their lows and the S&P 500 slipping below 1,200 and the Dow below 11,000 — the two milestones (first achieved 11 years ago). Gold rallied 1.2% even with an advancing dollar while Treasury yields slid below 3.7% as both asset classes flexed their safe-have muscles (and a barbell strategy that has worked wonders for a decade now).

… but yet all we hear from the rose-coloured bullish pundits is how we have to now measure the U.S. equity market based on "global considerations", not merely the American economy

First, the equity market wobbled yesterday even in the aftermath of CAT's and Whirlpool's earnings reports, which was an early sign that a whole lot of good news — and then some — is already being discounted. On the Greece file, the big concern now is contagion risks to the rest of the Club Med countries. The headlines were all about Greece, but the real action was in Portugal — and it's not pretty.

So, what we are talking about is heightened risk premia at a time when a 17x VIX index is underscoring a very high level of confidence over the outlook for the economy and financial market performance. Keep in mind that Europe comprises a nontrivial 20% of global GDP and the prospects for recovery have been dealt a big blow as the fiscal tourniquet tightens around the periphery.

For all the talk of the B.R.I.C. countries, the Euro region is three times as important for U.S. producers. I believe that for the first time in this 13-month flashy rally off the lows, investors are going to be re-introduced to the notion of risk and that equity valuation can move in both directions.

CHINESE STOCK MARKET LEADS COMMODITY PRICES

To very little fanfare, the Chinese stock market — the first index to turn around in late 2008 — has slipped into a bear market. It is down 15 % from the nearby high and 20% from last year's interim peak. Why this is important is because the Shanghai index leads the CRB commodity spot price index by four months with a 72% correlation (and over an 80% correlation with the oil price). Don't get us wrong — we are long-term secular commodity bulls; however, we have been agnostic this year from a tactical standpoint — never hurts to take profits after a double!

CHART 1: TIME TO TAKE PROFITS — CHINESE STOCK MARKET LEADS THE CRB INDEX BY FOUR MONTHS

Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

HOME PRICES FINALLY DECLINE AGAIN

The Case-Shiller seasonally adjusted (SA) home price index fell 0.1% MoM in February for the 20-city composite index and the nonseasonally adjusted (raw) data showed a 0.85% MoM slide. This was the first decline on an SA basis since April 2009 and the largest raw decline since March of last year when we were facing the abyss. Yes, yes, the perennial bulls are out with their story that the YoY trend turned positive for the first time since December 2006, but this is totally skewed by the depressed base of a year ago when prices sank 2.2% sequentially.

On a regional basis, 19 of the 20 cities recorded price declines during the month on a NSA basis; 15 on a SA basis. This validates all of the other home price series that have come out of late and remember that C-S is a three-month average (the raw data are down now for FIVE months running). Home price deflation is back, Jack, and with a *de facto* 16 months' supply of unsold inventory, there is such a huge supply overhang that more price reduction is very likely on its way.

U.S. consumer confidence rose to 57.9 April, to 57.9. This may appear like good news, but if we are truly in an economic recovery, then this metric would be closer to 102 by now

Los Angeles seems to be a "leading indicator" — condo prices there started falling about 12 months before the other cities and note that it is now down two months in a row in February in NSA terms (and fell 0.4% MoM in SA terms).

CONFIDENCE RETURNS … SORT OF

U.S. consumer confidence rose 5.6 points in April, to 57.9 — the highest level since September 2008. This may appear like good news, but if we are truly in an economic recovery, then this metric would be closer to 102 by now. Actually, at 57.9, this level is way below the average during recession (70.8) and the average that we typically see at the end of a recession (71.5).

While the job components did improve, what did not was the homebuying intentions index, which sagged to 2.0 in April from 2.8 in March — the low-watermark for the year. While expectations for jobs in six-months were up in April, to 18.0 from 14.1 — the highest since August 2009, expectations for income out six months actually fell — down to 10.3 from 10.8. And, it's the income people get from their job that they spend (though with almost 20% of personal income now coming from government transfers, there is always the chance that the Obama team will find a way to tap the bond market for some funds to give away).

CANADA — JUST HOW PRISTINE?

The quote below is from the Bank of Canada's Financial System Review, which was published back on December 2009 — forewarned is forearmed:

> *"Financial institutions need to carefully consider the aggregate risk to their entire portfolio of household exposures when evaluating even an insured mortgage, since a household defaulting on an insured mortgage would likely be unable to meet its other debt obligations. This implies that the overall quality of a bank's loan portfolio would deteriorate, even if no loss is incurred on the insured mortgage itself. In addition, claims to recover losses on insured mortgages are not themselves without cost.*
>
> *The potential for system-wide stress arising from substantial credit losses on Canadian household loan portfolios remains a relatively low-probability risk at the moment, particularly given the near-term prospects for growth. However, the likelihood of this risk materializing in the medium term is judged to have risen as a result of increased indebtedness.*

While this suggests that positive momentum in the global economy is stronger than envisioned at the time of the last FSR, economic growth is nonetheless likely to remain subdued for some time as necessary structural adjustments take place.

Deleveraging of the balance sheets of both financial institutions and households, for example, remains incomplete.

Although the uncertainty surrounding the global economic outlook has diminished somewhat, it nevertheless remains elevated. As well, there is a risk that self-sustaining growth in private demand, a prerequisite for a solid recovery, may take longer than expected to materialize, given that the recovery currently relies on an unprecedented level of policy stimulus. Reflecting the high level of uncertainty worldwide, there is a wide divergence in forecasts for global economic growth.

With the slow pace of the recovery, the global economy is vulnerable to additional negative shocks. While the probability of a renewed, synchronous decline in world output is fairly low, even a slower-than-expected recovery may have important implications for the international financial system. If the global recovery does not live up to market expectations, a market correction could ensue. A modest market correction can normally be considered a useful purging of excess risk taking and a re-evaluation of fundamental factors. In the current environment, however, an economic downturn or a significant market correction arising from renewed pessimism could, in a worst-case scenario, reactivate the adverse feedback loop between the real economy and financial markets (by which declines in overall economic growth and in markets reinforce each other)."

Consider the charts below:

As of February, housing starts were up a record 78% year-over-year (and in March up a hefty 38%). Build it and they will come.

The homebuilders are now adding 200,000 annualized housing starts in the stock of residential real estate, well above the 175,000 increment demand from net household formation.

CHART 2: HOMEBUILDERS KEEP ON BUILDING

Canada: Housing Starts
(year-over-year percent change)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

And, we are seeing a parabolic bubble in single-family construction.

CHART 3: PACE OF SINGLE-FAMILY STARTS RUNNING AT 86% YoY

Canada: Single-Family Housing Starts
(year-over-year percent change)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

With building permits up a resounding 60% from a year ago, even more supply is on its way.

CHART 4: MORE SUPPLY IS ON ITS WAY

Canada: Residential Building Permits
(year-over-year percent change)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Then Bank of Canada is about to hike rates at a time when housing affordability is flirting with all-time lows. House price gains have swamped the growth in wage income.

CHART 5: HOUSING AFFORDABILITY FLIRTING WITH ALL TIME LOWS

Canada: Housing Affordability Index
(ratio)

Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

The ratio of residential mortgage-to-real estate assets has risen nearly three-percentage points in the past year, to now stand at 60.7%.

CHART 6: MORTGAGES RELATIVE TO RESIDENTIAL ASSETS NOW AT A RECORD 60.7%

Canada: Mortgages-to-Residential Structures Ratio
(percent)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Debt bubble — Canadian style. The ratio of household debt-to-GDP is up almost 10 percentage points in the past year, to 94%. This is unprecedented.

CHART 7: Debt Bubble — Canadian Style

Canada: Household Debt-to-GDP Ratio
(percent)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

The ratio of household debt to assets is nearly a third higher today than it was a decade ago.

CHART 8: HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO ASSET RATIO NEAR RECORD HIGHS …

Canada: Debt-to-Total Assets Ratio
(percent)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Ditto for debt-to-net worth. We may be more American than we would like to believe.

CHART 9: … DITTO FOR DEBT-TO-NET WORTH

Canada: Debt-to-Net Worth Ratio
(percent)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Canadians have steadily been taking on higher home loan-to-value mortgages. Hence the decline in owners' equity to decade lows.

CHART 10: … DITTO FOR DEBT-TO-NET WORTH

Canada: Homeowners' Equity as a percent of Real Estate
(percent)



Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Even though interest rates sank to record lows, household interest payments did not because of the massive runup in debt. If the Bank of Canada goes on a 2004-07 style tightening cycle, it would drain about $25 billion in household spending. That alone would be a 2-3% hit to the base-line growth in Canadian consumer spending.

CHART 11: DEBT-SERVICE RATIO SADDLED BY MASSIVE RUNUP IN DEBT

Canada: Household Debt Service Ratio
(percent)

Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

Gluskin Sheff at a Glance

Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. is one of Canada's pre-eminent wealth management firms. Founded in 1984 and focused primarily on high net worth private clients, we are dedicated to the prudent stewardship of our clients' wealth through the delivery of strong, risk-adjusted investment returns together with the highest level of personalized client service.

OVERVIEW

As of December 31, 2009, the Firm managed assets of $5.3 billion.

Gluskin Sheff became a publicly traded corporation on the Toronto Stock Exchange (symbol: GS) in May 2006 and remains 54% owned by its senior management and employees. We have public company accountability and governance with a private company commitment to innovation and service.

Our investment interests are directly aligned with those of our clients, as Gluskin Sheff's management and employees are collectively the largest client of the Firm's investment portfolios.

We offer a diverse platform of investment strategies (Canadian and U.S. equities, Alternative and Fixed Income) and investment styles (Value, Growth and Income).[1]

The minimum investment required to establish a client relationship with the Firm is $3 million for Canadian investors and $5 million for U.S. & International investors.

PERFORMANCE

$1 million invested in our Canadian Value Portfolio in 1991 (its inception date) would have grown to $10.7 million[2] on December 31, 2009 versus $5.5 million for the S&P/TSX Total Return Index over the same period.

$1 million USD invested in our U.S. Equity Portfolio in 1986 (its inception date) would have grown to $11.7 million USD[2] on December 31, 2009 versus $9.2 million USD for the S&P 500 Total Return Index over the same period.

INVESTMENT STRATEGY & TEAM

We have strong and stable portfolio management, research and client service teams. Aside from recent additions, our Portfolio Managers have been with the Firm for a minimum of ten years and we have attracted "best in class" talent at all levels. Our performance results are those of the team in place.

We have a strong history of insightful bottom-up security selection based on fundamental analysis.

For long equities, we look for companies with a history of long-term growth and stability, a proven track record, shareholder-minded management and a share price below our estimate of intrinsic value. We look for the opposite in equities that we sell short.

For corporate bonds, we look for issuers with a margin of safety for the payment of interest and principal, and yields which are attractive relative to the assessed credit risks involved.

We assemble concentrated portfolios — our top ten holdings typically represent between 25% to 45% of a portfolio. In this way, clients benefit from the ideas in which we have the highest conviction.

Our success has often been linked to our long history of investing in under-followed and under-appreciated small and mid cap companies both in Canada and the U.S.

PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION

In terms of asset mix and portfolio construction, we offer a unique marriage between our bottom-up security-specific fundamental analysis and our top-down macroeconomic view.

Our investment interests are directly aligned with those of our clients, as Gluskin Sheff's management and employees are collectively the largest client of the Firm's investment portfolios.

$1 million invested in our Canadian Value Portfolio in 1991 (its inception date) would have grown to $10.7 million[2] on December 31, 2009 versus $5.5 million for the S&P/TSX Total Return Index over the same period.

For further information, please contact questions@gluskinsheff.com

Notes:

Unless otherwise noted, all values are in Canadian dollars.

1. *Not all investment strategies are available to non-Canadian investors. Please contact Gluskin Sheff for information specific to your situation.*
2. *Returns are based on the composite of segregated Value and U.S. Equity portfolios, as applicable, and are presented net of fees and expenses.*

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

Copyright 2010 Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. ("Gluskin Sheff"). All rights reserved. This report is prepared for the use of Gluskin Sheff clients and subscribers to this report and may not be redistributed, retransmitted or disclosed, in whole or in part, or in any form or manner, without the express written consent of Gluskin Sheff. Gluskin Sheff reports are distributed simultaneously to internal and client websites and other portals by Gluskin Sheff and are not publicly available materials. Any unauthorized use or disclosure is prohibited.

Gluskin Sheff may own, buy, or sell, on behalf of its clients, securities of issuers that may be discussed in or impacted by this report. As a result, readers should be aware that Gluskin Sheff may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. This report should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and readers are encouraged to seek independent, third-party research on any companies covered in or impacted by this report.

Individuals identified as economists do not function as research analysts under U.S. law and reports prepared by them are not research reports under applicable U.S. rules and regulations. Macroeconomic analysis is considered investment research for purposes of distribution in the U.K. under the rules of the Financial Services Authority.

Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or other financial instrument or any derivative related to such securities or instruments (e.g., options, futures, warrants, and contracts for differences). This report is not intended to provide personal investment advice and it does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in financial instruments and implementing investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. Any decision to purchase or subscribe for securities in any offering must be based solely on existing public information on such security or the information in the prospectus or other offering document issued in connection with such offering, and not on this report.

Securities and other financial instruments discussed in this report, or recommended by Gluskin Sheff, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are not deposits or other obligations of any insured depository institution. Investments in general and, derivatives, in particular, involve numerous risks, including, among others, market risk, counterparty default risk and liquidity risk. No security, financial instrument or derivative is suitable for all investors. In some cases, securities and other financial instruments may be difficult to value or sell and reliable information about the value or risks related to the security or financial instrument may be difficult to obtain. Investors should note that income from such securities and other financial instruments, if any, may fluctuate and that price or value of such securities and instruments may rise or fall and, in some cases, investors may lose their entire principal investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Levels and basis for taxation may change.

Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or financial instrument mentioned in this report. Investors in such securities and instruments effectively assume currency risk.

Materials prepared by Gluskin Sheff research personnel are based on public information. Facts and views presented in this material have not been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other business areas of Gluskin Sheff. To the extent this report discusses any legal proceeding or issues, it has not been prepared as nor is it intended to express any legal conclusion, opinion or advice. Investors should consult their own legal advisers as to issues of law relating to the subject matter of this report. Gluskin Sheff research personnel's knowledge of legal proceedings in which any Gluskin Sheff entity and/or its directors, officers and employees may be plaintiffs, defendants, co-defendants or co-plaintiffs with or involving companies mentioned in this report is based on public information. Facts and views presented in this material that relate to any such proceedings have not been reviewed by, discussed with, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other business areas of Gluskin Sheff in connection with the legal proceedings or matters relevant to such proceedings.

Any information relating to the tax status of financial instruments discussed herein is not intended to provide tax advice or to be used by anyone to provide tax advice. Investors are urged to seek tax advice based on their particular circumstances from an independent tax professional.

The information herein (other than disclosure information relating to Gluskin Sheff and its affiliates) was obtained from various sources and Gluskin Sheff does not guarantee its accuracy. This report may contain links to third-party websites. Gluskin Sheff is not responsible for the content of any third-party website or any linked content contained in a third-party website. Content contained on such third-party websites is not part of this report and is not incorporated by reference into this report. The inclusion of a link in this report does not imply any endorsement by or any affiliation with Gluskin Sheff.

All opinions, projections and estimates constitute the judgment of the author as of the date of the report and are subject to change without notice. Prices also are subject to change without notice. Gluskin Sheff is under no obligation to update this report and readers should therefore assume that Gluskin Sheff will not update any fact, circumstance or opinion contained in this report.

Neither Gluskin Sheff nor any director, officer or employee of Gluskin Sheff accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential damages or losses arising from any use of this report or its contents.